Why Fools Choose to be Fools: A Look at What Compels Indigent Criminal Defendants to Choose Self-Representation by Milton, Mark C.
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 54 
Number 1 (Fall 2009) Article 12 
2009 
Why Fools Choose to be Fools: A Look at What Compels Indigent 
Criminal Defendants to Choose Self-Representation 
Mark C. Milton 
markcmilton@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark C. Milton, Why Fools Choose to be Fools: A Look at What Compels Indigent Criminal Defendants to 
Choose Self-Representation, 54 St. Louis U. L.J. (2009). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol54/iss1/12 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
385 
WHY FOOLS CHOOSE TO BE FOOLS: A LOOK AT WHAT 
COMPELS INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS TO CHOOSE 
SELF-REPRESENTATION 
“You don’t have a name.  You don’t have a face.  You’re just another case.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
This past summer, codefendants Tyrone Jackson and his girlfriend Madlon 
Ladd faced a five-count federal felony drug indictment.2  Both were charged 
for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine.3  Both were deemed 
indigent,4 lacking the resources to procure private attorneys, and thus entitled 
to counsel paid for by the government.5  Ms. Ladd went to trial with a court-
appointed attorney.  Mr. Jackson, however, informed the trial court judge that 
he wished to waive his right to counsel and represent himself, citing 
dissatisfaction with his assigned federal public defender.6  After 
acknowledging that Mr. Jackson had made his waiver of counsel both 
knowingly and voluntarily, the judge allowed Mr. Jackson to represent 
himself.7  After just over four days of trial, a jury found both defendants guilty. 
 
 1. Interview with Tyrone Jackson, Pro Se Defendant, in Belleville, Ill. (January 9, 2009) 
(recording on file with the author). 
 2. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Jackson, No. 08-30003-WDS-DGW (S.D.Ill., 
July 8, 2008). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a) (2006) (defining indigency as being 
“financially unable to obtain an adequate representation”); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-7-6 
(1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4504 (2007); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 44(a); ALAB. CODE. § 15-12-1(1) 
(2007) (defining indigent as “financially unable to pay for his or her defense”); PA. R. CRIM. P. 
122(A)(1) (2005) (discussing legal representation for “defendants who are without financial 
resources or otherwise unable to employ counsel”). 
 5. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938) (providing that a poor criminal 
defendant may have counsel provided by the state). 
 6. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1. 
 7. Minutes of Hearing Regarding Status of Counsel, United States v.  Jackson, No. 08-CR-
30003-WDS (S.D.Ill., June 6, 2008) (“[The] Court advises the defendant that it would be in his 
best interest to proceed to trial with an attorney and strongly advises the defendant not to proceed 
to trial without counsel.”).  Judge Stiehl, the district court judge, also appointed Rodney Holmes 
as standby counsel for Mr. Jackson for the remainder of the proceedings.  Minutes of Final 
Pretrial Conference, United States v.  Jackson, No. 08-CR-30003-WDS (S.D. Ill., June 18, 2008). 
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There was never a sense that the trial was unfair or even that Mr. Jackson 
did an inadequate job of representing himself.8  To the contrary, his knowledge 
of the law, courtroom demeanor, and charismatic personality were all quite 
remarkable.  The evidence against him, however, was overwhelming.  He 
likely would have been convicted even with the assistance of counsel.  That 
being said, the intriguing question remains: what compelled Mr. Jackson to 
proceed without the assistance of counsel?  Did he believe he could do a better 
job of presenting his case to a jury than a trained lawyer appointed by the 
court?  Or simply, did his distrust and disdain for the criminal justice system 
cause him to refuse assistance from a social institution he perceived as unfair?  
If so, does the court have an obligation to step in and dispel misunderstandings 
that underlie the decisions of indigent criminal defendants, like Mr. Jackson, to 
go pro se?  This Comment seeks to gain an understanding of the incentives and 
misconceptions that induce indigent criminal defendants like Mr. Jackson to 
forgo their constitutional right to counsel at trial.9 
It has long been said that one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a 
client.10  Still, prosecutors and judges have recently experienced an influx of 
indigent criminal defendants choosing pro se representation.  In response, 
some in the legal community have harshly criticized this trend.11  This 
Comment contends that unless the legal profession changes its approach to 
providing indigent defense counsel and designs more effective ways to handle 
waiver-of-counsel inquiries, courts may find an even greater number of pro se 
indigent defendants flooding their dockets. 
Most commentators who are troubled by the inclination of indigent 
defendants to choose self-representation base their criticisms on 
unsubstantiated assumptions, suggesting that these defendants do an 
 
 8. This is based on the author’s experience in the district court for the Southern District of 
Illinois during Mr. Jackson’s trial. 
 9. It is important to note that this Comment usually refers to “indigent criminal defendants” 
as a single population.  While this classification may suffer the same weaknesses of most 
generalizations, it does not undermine the goal of this Comment, which is to gain an 
understanding of what contributes to the decision for many indigent defendants to choose self-
representation. 
 10. Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at 
the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 438 (2007). 
 11. In the 2006 State of the Ohio Judiciary address, Chief Justice Moyer of the Ohio 
Supreme Court expressed his irritation with the growing number of criminal defendants choosing 
to represent themselves.  Editorial, Eliminating the Pro Se Litigant, N. COUNTRY GAZETTE, Sept. 
23, 2006, http://www.northcountrygazette.org/articles/092306ProSeLitigants.html; see also John 
F. Decker, The Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the 
Guarantee of Self-Representation Twenty Years After Faretta, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483, 
489 (1996) (arguing that self-representation “undermines the integrity and efficiency of the 
criminal justice system”). 
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inadequate job of representing themselves.12  To the contrary, one empirical 
study has shown that pro se felony defendants achieve acquittals at rates 
equivalent or higher than those defendants with attorneys.13  In addition, nearly 
80% of those individuals surveyed did not show any visible signs of mental 
illness,14 dispelling the notion that anyone who chooses to waive counsel is 
somehow chemically imbalanced.  Despite the statistical support 
demonstrating that some indigent defendants are better off (or at least not 
worse off) by going pro se, the legal profession should nevertheless strive to 
dispel any misconceptions among defendants that proceeding to trial without 
licensed counsel is advantageous. 
For indigent defendants, perception may not always equate with reality.  
Yet the concerns of these defendants are not beyond our understanding.  This 
Comment maintains that most indigent defendants make the decision as a last 
resort to escape their feelings of helplessness.  Those quick to criticize the 
decision to go pro se are likely unwilling to recognize or address the root of 
such a decision.  Rather than condemning pro se representation, or calling for 
the overturn of the Supreme Court’s finding of the right to self-
representation,15 this Comment examines what compels indigent criminal 
defendants to choose pro se representation in the first place.  Deficiencies in 
the criminal justice system, both real and perceived, foster the desire and 
understandable necessity for many indigent criminal defendants to represent 
themselves.  As such, this Comment questions whether our current system 
fulfills its constitutional obligation to provide indigent criminal defendants 
with proper representation in the event they accept court-appointed counsel.16  
From there, this Comment will make recommendations for how the legal 
profession can diminish the likelihood that indigent criminal defendants will 
choose pro se representation. 
To accomplish these ends, this Comment is broken into four segments.  
Part I details the historical development of the right to proceed pro se, 
beginning with an examination of the right to counsel, and continuing with a 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s recognition of the constitutional guarantee 
of the right to self-representation.  Part II examines the current state of the 
 
 12. Hashimoto, supra note 10, at 438. 
 13. Id. at 423. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Former Solicitor General, Kenneth Starr, unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme Court to 
overturn Faretta, which conferred upon criminal defendants the right to self-representation.  See 
United States v. Egwaoje, 335 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 2003 WL 
22697568 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2003) (No. 03-691); Egwaoje v. United States, 541 U.S. 958 (2004) 
(denying cert.). 
 16. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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indigent defense system,17 showing how its shortcomings seemingly validate 
the decision by many indigent defendants to proceed pro se.  Part III addresses 
the psychological or sociological factors that may compel indigent defendants, 
like Tyrone Jackson, to refuse the assistance of counsel in favor of self-
representation.  In accordance with the belief that pro se representation is not 
the preferred course of action for indigent criminal defendants, Part IV will 
recommend some normative policies designed to encourage indigent criminal 
defendants to accept the assistance of counsel rather than choosing self-
representation. 
I.  THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL VS. THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION 
This section examines two important constitutional rights that arise from 
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment: (1) the indigent 
defendant’s right to counsel and (2) the right to self-representation.18  In 
Gideon v. Wainwright,19 the Court granted indigent defendants the right to 
counsel in all serious criminal matters,20 while in Faretta v. California,21 the 
Court held that a defendant could waive that right and choose self-
representation.22 Although Gideon envisioned something akin to representation 
for all, its implementation has done very little to bolster indigent defendants’ 
confidence in those attorneys assigned to their defense.23  As a result, some 
indigent defendants choose to waive the right to counsel and exercise the right 
of self-representation.  Since Faretta’s conferral of the right to self-
representation, the careless administration of waiver-of-counsel inquiries by 
trial courts has further facilitated the propensity of indigent defendants to 
exercise their constitutionally protected right to self-representation. 
A. The Right to Counsel for Indigent Defendants 
Without the Gideon Court finding that the government has a constitutional 
obligation to provide the assistance of counsel to indigent defendants in 
criminal proceedings, discussion of whether such defendants should be 
 
 17. “Indigent defense system” encompasses both federal and state public defender offices 
and court-appointed attorneys utilized by many courts.  See, e.g., ALAB. CODE. § 15-12-1(5) 
(describing indigent defense system as a “method or mixture of methods for providing legal 
representation to an indigent defendant, including use of appointed counsel, use of contract 
counsel, use of public defenders, or any other alternative method meeting constitutional 
requirements”). 
 18. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 19. 372 U.S. at 335. 
 20. Id. at 335. 
 21. 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
 22. Id. at 807. 
 23. See David A. Simon, Comment, Equal Before the Law: Toward a Restoration of 
Gideon’s Promise, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 581, 582 (2008). 
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allowed to proceed with pro se representation would be moot.  Many would 
simply have no choice but to represent themselves. 
That was the predicament facing Clarence Earl Gideon.  Charged with a 
felony and lacking the financial means to procure a lawyer, Clarence Gideon 
was forced to conduct his own defense.24  After providing the best defense that 
“could be expected from a layman,”25 a jury convicted Mr. Gideon and 
sentenced him to five years in prison.26  In a handwritten letter to the Justices 
of the Supreme Court, Mr. Gideon pleaded for help.27  Analogizing the note to 
a writ of certiorari, the Court decided to hear his case.28  The Court ultimately 
held that the Constitution guarantees indigent defendants the right to counsel 
when facing serious criminal charges, and such counsel must be paid for by the 
state.29  Since then, however, states have struggled with the financial burden of 
providing such representation.30 
1. If They Have No Say, Why Not Go Pro Se? 
The right to counsel does not confer upon indigent criminal defendants any 
right to the counsel of their choice.31  Further, the lack of sufficient safeguards 
to protect such defendants from ineffective indigent defense counsel and the 
inability to style a mode of defense to their liking also contributes to the 
unwillingness to acquiesce to indigent defense counsel.32  It is this general lack 
of choice which forces the hand of many indigent defendants to choose self-
representation when permitted to do so by trial courts. 
a. Lack of Choice Breeds Contempt: The System’s Disdain for Indigent 
Defendants 
In most cases, indigent criminal defendants do not choose their lawyers.33  
Lacking financial means to procure a private attorney, some defendants may be 
 
 24. Id. at 581. 
 25. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337. 
 26. Simon, supra note 23, at 581. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335.  Gideon extended the right to counsel by including indigent 
defendants in all cases, both federal and state.  The Court had previously established that indigent 
defendants have the right to the assistance of counsel in federal court cases.  See Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938). 
 30. See infra Part II. 
 31. Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant: 
Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the 
Indigent?, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 199 (1998); see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 
159 (1988) (“[A] defendant may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford.”). 
 32. “Indigent defense counsel” refers to both public defenders and private court-appointed 
attorneys. 
 33. See Holly, supra note 31, at 199. 
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fortunate enough to have a lawyer in the family or an acquaintance who is 
willing to provide legal assistance.  Perhaps in a widely publicized case, they 
may garner the attention of an attorney who offers to take the case pro bono.  
Yet these are options available to few indigent defendants, and in some 
instances, the “family friends” and/or “pro-bono” lawyers referenced above 
may lack the experience to handle serious criminal cases, potentially leaving 
the defendant worse off.  Most indigent defendants, therefore, are forced to 
settle for the attorney appointed by the court or assigned by a local public 
defender office. 34  Based on that spin of the roulette wheel, indigent criminal 
defendants are stuck with attorneys whom they did not choose and, in many 
cases, do not trust. 
Nonindigent defendants choose lawyers with whom they hope they can 
develop trust, and without that trust, “the relationship is indeed meaningless.”35  
Such trust helps facilitate the notion that the attorney is advocating on behalf of 
his client.36  Much of the rationale underlying the idea that nonindigent 
defendants should be allowed to retain the counsel of their choice encompasses 
constitutional ideals that should carry over to indigent defendants as well.37  
Those include maintaining an adversarial system to ensure fairness in criminal 
prosecutions, the right to free choice, and the preservation of individual 
freedom.38  Yet for indigent criminal defendants, the power of selecting their 
attorneys is vested in the sole discretion of the trial court or a local state or 
federal public defenders’ office.39 
The choice is made without any regard for the defendant’s preferences, and 
courts make it extremely difficult for indigent defendants to replace attorneys 
with whom they find no comfort.  While making the decision to disregard a 
defendant’s preferences when appointing counsel or in deferring to a public 
defender’s office may provide judicial economy, it fails to instill the indigent 
defendant with any faith in counsel.  But in support of deferring to the trial 
court’s determination of appointed counsel, some argue that judges are better 
able to make the choice because they “know the abilities of the available local 
 
 34. See Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2006). 
 35. Janet C. Hoeffel, Toward a More Robust Right to Counsel of Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 525, 527 (2007); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt.2 (2009) 
[hereinafter MRPC] (highlighting that “trust ‘is the hallmark of the client-lawyer relationship’”). 
 36. See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 645 (1989) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]rust between attorney and client . . . is necessary for the attorney to be a truly 
effective advocate.”); United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 56 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[T]he most 
important decision a defendant makes in shaping his defense is his selection of an attorney.”). 
 37. Holly, supra note 31, at 200. 
 38. Id. 
 39. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A. 
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counsel,”40 and allowing defendants the choice will “disrupt the ‘even handed 
distribution of assignments.’”41  Allowing defendants to choose counsel might 
also enable repeat offenders to monopolize the best lawyers.42  Still, none of 
these justifications erase reservations in the minds of many indigent defendants 
regarding the level of protection their appointed counsel will provide. 
Maybe it is a product of our country’s capitalist foundation, but people like 
having choices, and we tend to react negatively when told we must do 
something, or that we are stuck with a particular outcome.  Human nature 
compels us look for a way out of such situations, especially when our backs are 
to the wall.  Many indigent criminal defendants, already skeptical of a system 
they perceive as unfair, are particularly concerned about being stuck with an 
attorney assigned by a system they feel is designed to throw them in prison.43  
For the indigent, the lines blur between the four arms of the criminal justice 
system: (1) the judge, (2) the prosecutor, (3) the defense attorney, and (4) the 
jury.44  So when a judge tells them that they must accept “lawyer X” as their 
attorney, suspicion arises.  Thus, the legal profession must determine how to 
foster faith in the system. 
b. Difficulty in Substituting Counsel 
In addition to lacking the initial choice of counsel, it is also extremely 
difficult for indigent defendants to replace counsel once it has been assigned.  
The defendant may obtain substitute counsel only upon a showing of “good 
cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication, 
or an irreconcilable conflict which [could] lead . . . to an apparently unjust 
verdict.”45  Courts have concluded that even a good-faith lack of confidence by 
a defendant in his attorney does not establish sufficient “good cause” to allow 
for replacement of counsel.46  More often than not, courts refuse additional 
substitutes, leaving many indigent defendants with a choice between the lesser 
of two perceived evils: accepting indigent defense counsel or going pro se.47 
 
 40. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.4(a), at 550 (1999) (quoting 
Peter W. Tague, An Indigent’s Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73, 79 
(1974)). 
 41. Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474 (7th Cir. 1979)). 
 42. Id. at 551. 
 43. See Interview with Jackson, supra note 1. 
 44. See infra Part III. 
 45. 3 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 40, at 555 (quoting McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 
1981)). 
 46. Id. at 555. 
 47. Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Counsel, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1216 (2006) (“[T]he courts should be more receptive when an indigent 
defendant who is not satisfied with the representation by assigned counsel moves to substitute 
counsel.”). 
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Probably the greatest impediment to success on a motion to substitute 
counsel is that blame for any friction in the current attorney–client relationship 
is automatically attributed to the indigent defendant.48  The boy who cries wolf 
(in the form of an indigent defendant who chronically demands different 
lawyers) diminishes the likelihood that an indigent defendant’s legitimate 
concerns about his attorney’s ability to represent him will be properly 
addressed.49  In many instances, “Defendants not only are given bad lawyers, 
they are tethered to them because defendant have no right to replace even the 
most incompetent and unsympathetic lawyer.”50  It is that tetherball cord that 
indigent defendants snap when they elect to go pro se, hoping that somehow 
self-representation enables them to present a more compelling case to a jury. 
c. No Right to Meaningful Representation 
It is not unreasonable for indigent defendants to believe that the system 
does not care about them.  In fact, Chief Justice Burger stated in Morris v. 
Slappy,51 that the Supreme Court “reject[s] the claim that the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees a ‘meaningful relationship’ between an accused and 
his counsel.”52  How can an indigent defendant ever develop trust with 
someone with whom they are guaranteed no meaningful relationship?  The 
Court’s language does little to foster confidence in indigent defense counsel.  
For most indigent defendants, the right to counsel of choice is already “a right 
that is nonexistent” for them.53  Slappy goes further and refuses an indigent 
defendant’s right to retain counsel that they may have developed a positive 
rapport with during a prior case.54  Allowing indigent defendants to keep an 
attorney that they trust would potentially dissuade some of them from electing 
pro se representation.  Regardless of the inherent difficulties in implementing 
such a scheme, courts should try to furnish attorneys for indigent defendants 
with whom they have a positive preexisting relationship.55 
 
 48. See, e.g., Douglas v. Warden, 591 A.2d 399, 405 (1991) (“Our courts are not, however, 
constitutionally required to comply with a demand for the appointment of a replacement counsel 
on the basis of a purported conflict that arises from the unreasonable conduct of the accused 
himself.”). 
 49. Id. at 406. 
 50. Richard A. Rosen, Reflections on Innocence, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 237, 253–54 (2006). 
 51. 461 U.S. 13 (1983). 
 52. Id. at 14 (emphasis added); see also Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 539 (“Chief Justice 
Burger . . . scoffed at the notion that the Sixth Amendment contains a right to a meaningful 
attorney-client relationship.”). 
 53. Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 526. 
 54. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 12–13. 
 55. See Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 549 (“[G]iven the importance of trust, autonomy, and 
fairness to the right to counsel of choice, the court should appoint the same attorney to represent 
an indigent defendant in his subsequent cases, if the defendant so chooses.”). 
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The more recent decision in Gonzalez–Lopez56 may indicate the Court’s 
willingness to allow for a more meaningful relationship between indigent 
defendants and their attorneys.  Justice Scalia suggested in his opinion, that for 
a trial to be truly fair, the accused should “be defended by the counsel he 
believes to be the best.”57  While the “trial court’s wide latitude in balancing 
the right to counsel of choice . . . against the demands of its calendar” 
precludes the Court from allowing the right to counsel of choice for indigent 
defendants,58 Professor Janet Hoeffel sees hope in Scalia’s opinion.59  She feels 
that by disaggregating the right to counsel of choice from the “mere effective 
assistance of counsel, Justice Scalia gives the issue new life,”60 possibly 
allowing greater expansion into the indigent’s ability to choose counsel.61 
d. Lack of Control Over Decision-Making 
Not only are indigent defendants left with an attorney they did not choose, 
they also have little control over the decision-making responsibilities regarding 
how their case should be handled.  Courts have traditionally found that defense 
counsel controls the tactical and strategic decision-making in a case.62  Distrust 
for counsel is thus only compounded when a defendant is unable to put forth 
the sort of defense he or she prefers.  From there, the option of pro se 
representation may be seen as the only viable way of presenting a defense that 
adheres to the desires of the indigent defendant, particularly given the 
unwillingness of courts to allow indigent defendants to substitute counsel with 
whom they disagree.63 
Lawyers have an obligation to consult with their clients in order to 
investigate possible defenses and to keep their client informed regarding 
developments of a pending case.64  Disagreements between a lawyer and a 
 
 56. 548 U.S. 140 (2006). 
 57. Id. at 146. 
 58. Id. at 152. 
 59. Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 548. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See infra Part IV. 
 62. Poulin, supra note 47, at 1239; see also Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 (1977) 
(Burger, C.J., concurring).  In discussing the authority of defense counsel, Justice Burger stated: 
  Once counsel is appointed, the day-to-day conduct of the defense rests with the 
attorney.  He, not the client, has the immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if 
and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop.  Not 
only do these decisions rest with the attorney, but such decisions must, as a practical 
matter be made without consulting the client.   
Id. (emphasis added). 
 63. See Poulin, supra note 47, at 1236 (“Only by electing to proceed pro se can the 
defendant assert control over the myriad tactical and strategic decisions that must be made in the 
course of any criminal case.”). 
 64. See MRPC, supra note 35, at R. 1.4(a)–(b). 
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client, however, are more prone to arise when a defendant distrusts his or her 
lawyer.65  Many choosing self-representation find the “sharing of authority 
with lawyers as intolerable.”66  Thus, when an indigent defendant chooses to 
proceed pro se, “the problem of conflict between lawyer and client 
disappears.”67 
2. Weak Protection from Ineffective Counsel 
Indigent defendants who choose to waive their right to counsel and 
proceed with pro se representation also forego the opportunity to appeal their 
convictions on grounds of ineffectiveness of counsel.68  At first glance, this 
could be seen as relinquishing a substantial right, and makes the decision to go 
pro se seem even more foolish since courts are supposed to protect indigent 
defendants from ineffective counsel.  Yet the legal standards defining 
“effective counsel” are satisfied by “the most minimal competence” from 
attorneys.69  Incidents of what seem like grossly improper conduct have been 
held to meet the standard of effective counsel by courts.  Not only may 
“overworked and incompetent” attorneys from a public defender’s office lead 
to “wrongful convictions,”70 but judges have sometimes condoned the conduct 
of private court-appointed lawyers who were unaware of applicable governing 
law and even those who have been intoxicated and/or asleep during trial.71 
In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test for 
determining the effectiveness of the assistance of counsel in criminal 
proceedings.72  Under this “cramped definition” of effective counsel,73 a 
criminal defendant must not only prove that counsel was deficient in his 
performance, but that the deficiency was a “but-for” cause of the outcome of 
the proceedings, i.e., a guilty verdict.74  Such a standard has been difficult for 
 
 65. Christopher Johnson, The Law’s Hard Choice: Self-Inflicted Injustice or Lawyer-
Inflicted Indignity, 93 KY. L.J. 39, 44–45 (2004). 
 66. Id. at 45. 
 67. Id. at 44. 
 68. Sarah Livingston Allen, Note, Faretta: Self-Representation, or Legal-Misrepresentation, 
90 IOWA L. REV. 1553, 1564 (2005) (stating that pro se defendants may not appeal their 
convictions “based on the quality of the defense that they provide for themselves”); see also 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (“[A] defendant who elects to represent 
himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of 
‘effective assistance of counsel.’”). 
 69. Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 526. 
 70. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National 
Crisis, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1036 (2006). 
 71. Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services 
to the Poor When Life and Liberty Are at Stake, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783, 785–86 (1997). 
 72. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984). 
 73. Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 526. 
 74. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 
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indigent defendants to overcome when appealing convictions on 
ineffectiveness of counsel grounds,75 particularly since it fails to address the 
financial shortcomings that inevitably lead to ineffective counsel.76  Moreover, 
the cavalier manner with which appellate courts have dismissed ineffective 
counsel appeals is troubling.  For instance, in more than 100 cases, the Sixth 
Circuit rejected such challenges by “issuing single-sentence orders that lacked 
explanation.”77  Additionally, other appellate courts have gone out of their way 
to rationalize the reprehensible conduct of counsel.78 
Roberto Miranda found out the hard way that courts often provide very 
little protection from ineffective counsel.79  Mr. Miranda was charged with 
several felonies, including first-degree murder, robbery with a deadly weapon, 
and larceny.80  His court-appointed public defender only recently had 
graduated from law school and had never handled a murder trial.81  On trial for 
his life, Mr. Miranda’s attorney failed to serve a subpoena on any of the forty 
people his client claimed could provide him with an alibi.82  Failure to 
investigate such a lynchpin matter ultimately contributed to Mr. Miranda’s 
conviction and subsequent death sentence.83  Such stories leave little assurance 
to defendants concerned about the quality of representation they will receive 
from indigent defense counsel.  It is reasonable to expect that some indigent 
defendants would feel uncomfortable with counsel they do not choose and 
have difficulty replacing. 
 
 75. See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the 
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.  625 (1986); 
Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2004). 
 76. Note, Effectively Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent 
Defense Systems, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1732 (2005).  The approach established in Strickland 
concerns only the end result rather than taking into account the detrimental effect on the quality 
of representation, which can result from an under funded and over worked public defender.  Id. 
 77. Fredric N. Tulsky, The High Cost of a Bad Defense, THE SAN JOSE MERCURY-NEWS, 
Jan. 24, 2006, at A1. 
 78. See id.  In one case, the court “suggested that an alcoholic lawyer’s repeated absences 
and tardiness during trial may have been a knowing tactic to permit him time to sober up before 
the jury saw him.” Id. 
 79. See Miranda v. Clark County, 279 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 80. Id. at 1105; see also Backus & Marcus, supra note 70, at 1034. 
 81. Miranda, 279 F.3d at 1105. 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  Mr. Miranda’s conviction was ultimately overturned, and he received a settlement 
from Clark County for $5 million in a lawsuit alleging a failure to provide adequate 
representation.  Carri Greer Thevenot, Settlement Ends Ex-Inmate’s Saga, LAS VEGAS REV. J., 
June 30, 2004, at 1A. 
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B. Constitutional Right to Proceed Pro Se 
Even with the constitutional right to counsel in serious criminal matters, 
indigent defendants who complain about their treatment may be greeted by the 
old adage, “beggars can’t be choosers.”  Rather than be perceived as a beggar, 
perpetually dissatisfied with assistance provided by the government, some 
indigent defendants understandably choose to waive the right to such counsel 
and proceed pro se. 
Prior to 1976, there had never been reason for the Court to consider the 
issue of whether an indigent defendant could waive the constitutional right of 
counsel established in Gideon and choose self-representation.84  Then, 
Anthony Faretta, an indigent man who refused to settle for court-appointed 
defense counsel whom he deemed unfit to represent his interests,85 posed the 
then-novel question: Did Gideon mean that indigent defendants are required to 
accept court-appointed counsel for their defense?86  The Supreme Court said 
no.87  Since then, however, courts have struggled with how to administer 
waiver of counsel inquiries in a way that ensures indigent defendants enter pro 
se representation with their “eyes open.”88 
1. The Supreme Court Grants the Right of Self-Representation 
In Faretta, the Supreme Court decided the issue of whether a state may 
force a lawyer onto a criminal defendant who desires to represent himself.89  
The Court found it unconstitutional to do so, and that free choice in the form of 
self-representation should prevail.90  The Court found that such a right was 
implied by the Sixth Amendment,91 relying on the language suggesting that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 
Assistance of Counsel . . . .”92  The majority of the Court interpreted “the 
assistance of counsel” clause to mean that a defendant has the right to the aid 
of counsel, but not that the state may impose such counsel on an unwilling 
defendant.93  The Court took the position that since “the defendant, and not his 
 
 84. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1976). 
 85. Id.  At trial, Mr. Faretta “did not want to be represented by the public defender because 
he believed that that office was ‘very loaded down with . . . a heavy case load.’”  Id. 
 86. Id. at 833–34. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). 
 89. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807. 
 90. Id. at 834. 
 91. Id. at 819 (“[T]he right to self-representation . . . is thus necessarily implied by the 
structure of the [Sixth] Amendment.”). 
 92. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 93. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819. 
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lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction,” the 
defendant should be allowed to make the ultimate determination.94 
The majority in Faretta believed that the Framers of the Constitution 
conceived the right to counsel as an optional means of defending oneself, not a 
mandate.95  As such, this ruling may be seen as a vote of confidence to indigent 
defendants—that the Constitution has faith in their ability to conduct their own 
defense in the event they choose to do so.96  People take great pride in rights 
given to them under the Constitution.  For indigent defendants facing criminal 
prosecution and potential prison time, clinging to such rights may amount to 
their last hope.97  Logically, many of those same defendants would seem more 
inclined to exercise those rights in order to flex their constitutional muscle at a 
system they perceive as unfair. 
2. Critics of Faretta Share Sentiments with Those Concerned About Pro 
Se Trend 
Those critical of the holding in Faretta argue that more is at stake than the 
self-indulgent interests of the criminal defendant.98  Perhaps society has a stake 
in ensuring the appearance of propriety in our criminal justice system.99  Chief 
Justice Burger, in his dissenting, and seemingly disgruntled, Faretta opinion, 
dismissed the notion that “the quality of . . . representation at trial is a matter 
with which only the accused is legitimately concerned.”100  The dissent would 
instead grant greater deference to the trial court in assessing whether the 
accused is sufficiently capable of conducting his or her defense.101  The dissent 
maintained that the integrity of the criminal justice system is undermined when 
 
 94. Id. at 834. 
 95. Id. at 832 (“[T]he colonists and the Framers . . . always conceived of the right to counsel 
as an ‘assistance’ for the accused, to be used at his option, in defending himself.”).  The Court 
was also very careful not to underestimate the value of a lawyer for a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding.  Id. 
 96. See id. at 834 (stating that the Founders would have thought the idea of a forced lawyer 
untenable). 
 97. See id. at 834–35 (recognizing that the Founders understood the value of freedom of 
choice). 
 98. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 839 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Nor is it accurate to suggest . . . that 
the quality of representation at trial is a matter with which only accused is legitimately 
concerned.”). 
 99. Id. (“[The] goal [of justice] . . . in every criminal trial . . . is ill-served, and the integrity 
of and public confidence in the system are undermined, when an easy conviction is obtained due 
to the defendant’s ill-advised decision to waive counsel.”). 
 100. Id. at 840 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the criminal justice system “should not 
be available as an instrument of self-destruction”); see also Johnson, supra note 65, at 41–42 
(“Many besides the defendant suffer when courts wrongfully convict or condemn, and our 
adversary system relies on the presentation of the best defense . . . .”). 
 101. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 840. 
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we allow defendants to waive counsel and proceed with pro se 
representation.102  This coincides with contemporary commentators who are 
alarmed by an increasing trend among indigent criminal defendants to select 
self-representation.103 
3. Strengthening the Trial Court’s Discretion: Waiver of Counsel 
Inquiries and the Relative Ease with Which Indigent Defendants Are 
Enabled to Go Pro Se 
Following Faretta, procedural safeguards intended to ensure the 
appearance of propriety in criminal prosecutions (and ease the concerns of the 
dissenters in Faretta) have been loosely implemented by trial courts.  More 
specifically, courts have failed to exercise the sort of discretion allowed by the 
Court when deciding whether to allow indigent defendants to proceed pro se.  
The reluctance of trial courts to assert their ascendancy over indigent 
defendants has undoubtedly contributed to the rise in pro se representation.  
This article contends that one of the reasons so many indigent defendants opt 
to go pro se is that the decision can be made far too hastily.  As such, courts 
have an obligation to step in and try to dissuade or, at a minimum, slow down 
indigent defendants who motion to waive their right to counsel and proceed 
pro se. 
The right to self-representation has never been held to be absolute, nor is it 
guaranteed throughout the entirety of proceedings.104  The majority in Faretta 
stated several grounds for denying a defendant the right to proceed pro se or to 
discontinue his self-representation once the trial has commenced.105  First, the 
defendant must make the request to proceed pro se in advance of trial to avoid 
disruption of scheduled proceedings.106  Typically, the motion must be made 
sometime before trial, and the trial court has broad discretion to reject what is 
perceives as untimely motions.107  Second, the trial court will not tolerate a pro 
se defendant who “engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.”108  
These goals of the Faretta inquiry, however, serve to promote judicial 
economy and the avoidance of a filibustering pro se defendant.109  They are not 
necessarily intended to serve the indigent defendant’s best interests. 
 
 102. Id. at 839.  Chief Justice Burger surely would be even more distraught over indigent 
defendants choosing self-representation because of their presumably lesser degree of intelligence. 
 103. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 104. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. (stating that the decision to go pro se is not “a license not to comply with relevant 
rules of procedural . . . law”).  The Court also mentions with approval that Faretta’s request was 
made “weeks before trial.” Id. at 835. 
 107. Id.; see also United States v. Young, 287 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 2002). 
 108. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. 
 109. Id. 
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More relevant to this discussion is that courts seem to have considerable 
discretion in determining whether the defendant fully appreciates the choice of 
self-representation and its potential risks, but often neglect to exercise such 
power.110  This judicial complacency only contributes to the rise of indigent 
defendants choosing pro se representation.  A more stern approach is necessary 
to curtail this trend.  Currently, the inquiry into whether the defendant grasps 
the magnitude of the decision to proceed pro se only hinges on whether the 
defendant has knowingly and intelligently relinquished the benefits of 
representation by counsel.111  Some courts begin with what has been coined the 
Von Moltke inquiry, which obligates the trial court to assess whether the 
defendant is making an informed decision to proceed pro se.112  For a waiver of 
counsel to be valid under that standard, the defendant must make such a waiver 
intelligently.  As the court stated, the defendant must possess: 
[A]n apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included 
within in them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible 
defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other 
facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.113 
The Von Moltke inquiry stems from a case where the defendant waived counsel 
and then pleaded guilty.114  In cases where the defendant seeks to go further 
and elect self-representation at trial, the additional Faretta inquiry is necessary. 
Faretta only states that the defendant “should be made aware of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation . . . so that . . . ‘his choice is 
made with eyes open.’”115  Faretta does not specifically require the court to 
warn indigent criminal defendants about the potential pitfalls of self-
representation, nor does it require the court to point out the latent benefits of 
representation from counsel.116  Over the years, courts have struggled with how 
 
 110. See Michael J. Kelly, Note, Making Faretta v. California Work Properly: Observations 
and Proposals for Administration of Waiver of Counsel Inquiries, 20 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL 
COMMENT. 245, 279–80 (2005). 
 111. A person charged with a felony in a state court has an unconditional and absolute 
constitutional right to a lawyer.  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963).  This right 
attaches at the pleading stage of the criminal process.  Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788–89 
(1945).  It may be waived only by voluntary and knowing action.  Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
458, 465 (1938). 
 112. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723 (1948). 
 113. Id. at 724. 
 114. Id. at 709. 
 115. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (emphasis added) (quoting Adams v. 
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). 
 116. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 271–72 (discussing various interpretations of the waiver 
requirement among the circuits, and emphasizing the difference between ‘should’ and ‘must’). 
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to conduct waiver-of-counsel inquiries under the amorphous dictum of 
Faretta.117 
Whether Faretta’s insistence that defendants “should” be made aware of 
the dangers of self-representation requires that trial courts provide an explicit 
warning to defendants prior to allowing them to elect self-representation has 
been the subject of much debate.118  All courts seem to recognize that the dicta 
in Faretta asks trial courts to strike a delicate balance between: 1) serving as a 
counselor to defendants by advising them of the potential pitfalls of self-
representation, and 2) overemphasis of the disadvantages of self-
representation, thereby scaring an otherwise pro se prone defendant into 
acquiescing to court-appointed counsel.119  Regarding these concerns, Judge 
Posner of the Seventh Circuit issued a warning: “If a judge exaggerates the 
advantages of being represented or the disadvantages of self-representation, he 
will be accused of having put his thumb on the scale and prevent[ing] the 
defendant from making an informed choice.”120  Posner feels that a judge 
should take responsibility for the defendant’s awareness of his rights.121  With 
respect to indigent criminal defendants, Posner’s take on the limited discretion 
that should be exercised by lower courts during waiver-of-counsel inquiries 
seems inconsistent with the sort of paternal protections the American 
government is accustomed to providing the indigent in matters of critical 
importance. 
Albeit not its job to act as advisor to every defendant who enters the 
courtroom without the assistance of counsel, the judge plays a key role in the 
propensity of indigent defendants choosing to go pro se.  In particular, judges 
who neglect to dispel misunderstandings that compel many indigent defendants 
to choose self-representation abandon their duty to ensure that such defendants 
elect pro se representation with “eyes open,” as the Constitution requires.122  
This Comment recommends a more thorough waiver-of-counsel to encourage 
courts to act in a paternal role when dealing with indigent defendants.  The 
lack of oversight when dealing with this group has undoubtedly led not only to 
the inclination, but the ability of indigent defendants to choose self-
representation.  While, perhaps, a court should not be obligated to issue an 
 
 117. See United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2004) (requiring the trial judge to 
ask the defendant a list of thirteen questions from a Bench Book for United States District 
Judges); United States v. Erskine, 355 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that the trial judge 
must “insure that [the defendant] understands 1) the nature of the charges against him; 2) the 
possible penalties; and 3) ‘the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation’”)). 
 118. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 263–65, 276. 
 120. Id. at 276 (quoting United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 672 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
 121. Id. (quoting Oreye, 263 F.3d at 672). 
 122. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex 
rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). 
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explicit warning about the potential pitfalls of self-representation to indigent 
defendants, the court should sternly advise the defendant about the gravity of 
the decision and have the discretion to prohibit such a move when made on 
largely irrational grounds. 
The less than well-to-do of American society (i.e. those qualifying as 
would-be indigent criminal defendants) often receive greater paternalistic 
supervision from the U.S. government,123 and there seems like no more 
suitable circumstance to perpetuate that control than when their liberty hangs 
in the balance.  In addition to the sentiments of Chief Justice Burger’s dissent 
in Faretta, trial courts should be given greater discretion during waiver of 
counsel inquiries,124 particularly when an indigent defendant chooses to go pro 
se based on concerns about the counsel assigned to represent him.125  A stern 
role for judges presiding over the decision to proceed at trial seems necessary 
for several reasons.  First, more is at stake when an indigent defendant decides 
to commence to trial rather than accept a plea bargain (usually for significantly 
less jail time) in the early stages of proceedings.126  Second, indigent 
defendants electing pro se representation at trial may have distorted ideas about 
what the experience will be like: defenses they will be able to assert, things 
they can say, etc.127  Judges should seize the opportunity to clear up any 
misconceptions that the defendant may have about going pro se. 
During waiver-of-counsel inquiries, many courts make use of the totality 
of circumstances approach rather than any sort of formulated test.128  This 
approach seems most appropriate for determining whether an indigent 
defendant is truly making the decision to go pro se with “eyes open,” because 
it allows the judge flexibility in determining whether the defendant appreciates 
the gravity of the decision.129  This allows the court to investigate concerns the 
indigent defendant may have regarding his attorney’s ability to conduct his 
defense.130  Yet, many courts fail to take advantage of this opportunity to 
 
 123. See STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 10–11 
(6th ed. 2006) (“[Paternalistic regulations] are at least partly justified on the grounds that 
government has a certain obligation to protect individuals from their own confusion and 
irresponsibility.”). 
 124. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 840 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he trial judge is in the best 
position to determine whether the accused is capable of conducting his defense.”). 
 125. See Klein, supra note 75, at 663–73 (providing an overview of conditions associated 
with representation by a public defender). 
 126. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 274. 
 127. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1.  Mr. Jackson was under the impression that he 
would be able to say and do things at trial that he otherwise would not have been able to do unless 
afforded the opportunity to represent himself. 
 128. Kelly, supra note 110, at 263, 266–69. 
 129. Id. at 264. 
 130. Id. at 266. 
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dissuade a defendant from proceeding pro se or, at least, discover the basis of 
that decision.131 
This is not to say that trial courts should never allow an indigent defendant 
to waive his right to counsel when the defendant truly believes that self-
representation is his best course of action.  But the court should only allow the 
waiver after it has engaged in a discussion to determine the basis for the 
defendant’s decision.  While a formal warning may not be required,132 the 
court should have discretion to intervene and override free choice when an 
indigent defendant makes an irrational decision to proceed pro se.  This is 
especially so when the qualifications of appointed counsel is balanced against 
the borderline competency of the defendant to conduct his own defense. 
Prudence should allow for an indigent defendant to understand not only the 
risks of self-representation, but to be informed of the possible benefits of 
acquiescing to indigent defense counsel.  Many defendants may fail to grasp 
exactly what level of defense they will receive from indigent defense counsel.  
For instance, a highly-respected attorney with the Federal Public Defender’s 
Office for the Southern District of Illinois was the appointed attorney for 
Tyrone Jackson in his case.  Federal public defenders have significantly lighter 
case loads than most state public defenders,133 and thus Mr. Jackson’s attorney 
would not have been so hindered by a crushing workload that might diminish 
his ability to serve Mr. Jackson.  But perhaps hearing about the incidences of 
overwhelming caseloads in public defender offices,134 Mr. Jackson was 
improperly influenced by that stereotype into dismissing his attorney. 
Another factor at the heart of Mr. Jackson’s decision to proceed pro se was 
that he was upset because his public defender never asked him whether or not 
he was innocent or guilty before going forward with his case.135  What 
defendants like Mr. Jackson fail to realize is that it is actually in the client’s 
best interest that attorneys not pry into the defendant’s guilt or innocence.  
According to Tom Flynn, a federal public defender for the Eastern District of 
Missouri, when criminal defense attorneys first meet their clients, they don’t 
say, “Johnny, did you do it?”136  If they do that and the client says, “‘Yeah, I 
did it,’ then that precludes [the attorney] from putting [the defendant] on the 
 
 131. Interview with Thomas Flynn & Kevin Curran, Federal Public Defenders for the Eastern 
District of Missouri, in St. Louis, Missouri. (Jan. 22, 2009).  Kevin Curran believes that courts are 
mistaken in failing to discuss with indigent defendants why exactly they are making the decision 
to proceed pro se.  Id.  Many judges concern themselves with the defendant’s behavior or mental 
state rather than asking about the attorney’s conduct which may underlie the defendant’s decision.  
Id. 
 132. See Kelly, supra note 110, at 254–57. 
 133. Interview with Flynn & Curran, supra note 131. 
 134. See infra Part II. 
 135. Interview with Jackson, supra note 1. 
 136. Interview with Flynn & Curran, supra note 131. 
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witness stand to say he didn’t do it, because then [we would] be knowingly 
suborning perjury.”137  During the waiver of counsel discussion, a judge could 
clear up such idiosyncrasies of the process that indigent defendants may not 
understand. 
It must be noted that some defendants elect to proceed to pro se after they 
become legitimately dissatisfied with their appointed indigent defense counsel 
and realize that substitute counsel is not a viable option.138  Perhaps the court 
conducting a more substantial inquiry into why that particular lawyer is 
unsatisfactory may help legitimize the court’s willingness to allow the 
defendant to waive the right to counsel.  This also provides the trial judge an 
opportunity to refute the defendant’s assertions about his counsel by, for 
instance, citing that attorney’s qualifications for handling the case. 
If one of the underlying reasons for granting discretion to trial courts in 
choosing counsel for indigent defendants is because they know local attorneys 
best,139 then when a defendant makes a motion to go pro se, the trial judge 
should be obligated to make a good-faith argument to the indigent defendant as 
to why he should retain his attorney.  Or, in the event that the lawyer is from a 
locally funded public defender office, someone with persuasive candor should 
be called on to speak to the capabilities of that individual.  Perhaps then, the 
defendant will reconsider his pro se decision in light of such an endorsement.  
If his failure to recognize the value of such assistance persists, the court should 
have the discretion to refuse a waiver that is irrational and arguably lacks 
intelligence. 
II.  INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS IN AMERICA INFLUENCES THE DECISION TO 
WAIVE COUNSEL 
The Supreme Court has voiced its disapproval of indigent defendants who 
waive their right to counsel: “Our experience has taught us that ‘a pro se 
defense is usually a bad defense, particularly compared with a defense 
provided by an experienced criminal defense attorney.’”140  Yet, such skill 
allegedly possessed by public defenders and court-appointed counsel does not 
always translate into the sort of compassionate counsel that so many indigent 
defendants desire.141  If society equates the appearance of justice in criminal 
 
 137. Id. 
 138. See supra Part I.A.1.b. 
 139. See supra text accompanying note 34. 
 140. Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000) (quoting Decker, supra 
note 11, at 598). 
 141. See Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: 
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for 
All Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 105 (1993) (quoting United States v. Ely, 
719 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing why “[t]he best criminal lawyers who accept 
appointments” might still provide indigent defendants unsatisfactory representation)).  See also 
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prosecutions with the indigent receiving representation by counsel, then 
society must address the shortfalls of the indigent defense counsel system and 
realize that an attorney may not always be more adept at handling a case than 
an indigent defendant representing himself.142 
A. A Broken System for the Indigent Defendant 
Most public defenders work for little pay and little gratitude, and many 
court-appointed attorneys are too distracted by their own private practices to 
care about indigent criminal cases assigned to them by local courts.143  If 
assistance from indigent defense counsel can be shown, in certain instances, to 
be only marginally better than self-representation, then why should we be 
surprised by an indigent defendant who chooses to proceed pro se? 
In the area of indigent criminal defense, one of the harshest critics of our 
criminal justice system has been Stephen Bright, a defense attorney and 
Professor of Law at Yale University.144  Over the years, he has fought to 
strengthen the indigent defendant’s constitutional right to counsel, and has 
often painted a picture of exactly why some defendants would choose to forego 
representation.145  Bright has criticized jurisdictions that overwork their public 
defenders and utilize incompetent local attorneys as court-appointed counsel.  
Bright notes: 
We’re seeing court systems that are run about like a fast food restaurant.  A 
fast food restaurant may be a little better, because at least there [are] some 
choices and a menu there for the customers.  But people are processed through 
court not understanding what’s happening to them, with no investigation by the 
lawyer, no understanding of who they are, when they’re sentenced.  They’re 
just processed through the system.146 
 
Erik Eckholm, Citing Workload, Public Lawyers Reject New Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at 
A1 (discussing how the time constraints caused by excessive case loads hinder public defenders 
from providing each indigent defendant with the appropriate representation). 
 142. To reiterate, the phrase “indigent defense counsel” is a broad term encompassing both 
lawyers from public defender offices and private attorneys appointed by the courts to represent 
indigent defendants. 
 143. See Frontline: The Plea (PBS television broadcast June 17, 2004) [hereinafter Frontline] 
(interviewing Stephen Bright, President and Senior Counsel, Southern Center for Human Rights); 
Hoeffel, supra note 35, at 543. 
 144. Bright also serves as President and Senior Counsel for the Southern Center for Human 
Rights.  The Law Office of the Southern Center for Human Rights, Who We Are, 
http://www.schr.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2010). 
 145. See Bright, Neither Equal Nor Just, supra note 71; see also Stephen B. Bright, Counsel 
for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE 
L.J. 1835 (1994). 
 146. Frontline, supra note 143. 
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Bright also reiterates: “Our courts have such a large volume of cases and 
so little resources devoted to providing representation to people accused of 
crimes, that this sort of fast food justice is what we’ve ended up with.”147  This 
sort of “McJustice” may not only deter poor criminal defendants from wanting 
to accept indigent defense counsel, but it also undermines the constitutional 
right to counsel.148 
Case loads have become so heavy for public defender offices that some 
jurisdictions have elected to stop using their services.149  A judge in Miami-
Dade County recently ruled that the court would stop sending lesser felony 
cases to the region’s public defender’s office until the situation imposing a 
“crushing caseload” on the office had improved.150  The judge cited budget 
problems as chief cause for this shortage of public defenders.151  Further, many 
court-appointed attorneys believe that budget cuts and soaring case loads have 
pushed them to the brink.152  In fact, the situation has become so dire that 
“[public defenders] can’t ethically handle this many cases.”153  As a result, the 
“quality of public defense” everywhere “is absolutely deteriorating.”154 
With such turmoil in the criminal justice system, it is no wonder that so 
many indigent defendants have grown to distrust the system.  To some, self-
representation is perceived as the most viable option to avoid 
misrepresentation.  As J. Marty Robinson, head of the Missouri public 
defender office put it, “If you’re providing [just] a warm body, you’re 
providing meaningless representation to everyone.”155  Indigent defendants 
demand and deserve more than just a warm body when their freedom is at 
stake, and the hot-bloodedness that results from criminal prosecution likely 
prompts some of them to take matters into their own hands in the form of self-
representation. 
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 148. Eckholm, supra note 141, at A1 (discussing how lawyers in Michigan joke about the 
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2005, at E1; Eckholm, supra note 141, at A1. 
 150. Curt Anderson, Public Defenders Make Drastic Proposals Amid Cuts, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, July 17, 2008, at A1.   Circuit Judge Stanford Blake believes that “evidence shows 
that the number of active cases is so high that the assistant public defenders are, at best, providing 
minimal competent representation to the accused.”  Id.  See also Patrick, supra note 149, at E1. 
 151. Anderson, supra note 150. 
 152. Eckholm, supra note 141, at A1. 
 153. Id. (quoting David J. Carroll, Director of Research for the National Legal Aid and 
Defender Association). 
 154. Id. (quoting Norman Lefstein, Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law). 
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Probably the greatest challenge facing jurisdictions that are strapped for 
funding is persuading the public to contribute more financial support to 
indigent criminal defense programs.  Indigent criminal defendants are 
politically unpopular.156  So mustering up financial or political capital to fix the 
problems facing those individuals is difficult to accomplish through the 
legislature.157  This leaves the courts to create a remedy.158  This Comment 
does not purport to call for sweeping reforms in the funding of indigent 
criminal defense systems; plenty of work has been done on that topic.159  
Rather, this Comment suggests potential ways to alleviate concerns held by 
indigent criminal defendants with regard to the level of representation they will 
receive from court appointed defenders.  Frankly, it seems unlikely that such 
reform will ever come about.  As such, it is up to the courts and members of 
the legal profession to figure out a way to combat the indigent defense counsel 
crisis. 
B. Resisting the Pressure to Plead 
One of the outcomes of a criminal justice system overwhelmed by 
caseloads is a necessity for criminal prosecutions to end in quick plea bargains.  
Everyone involved in the criminal justice process, less the indigent defendant 
who maintains his innocence, has an interest in seeing that a case not to go to 
trial.160  In particular, there is substantial pressure on both prosecutors and 
indigent defense counsel to convince defendants to take deals for lesser 
offenses in order to avoid the time and expense of trials.161  This only helps 
facilitate the notion held by many indigent defendants that their attorneys are 
playing an integral part in a “system” that is trying to lock him up. 
Admittedly, in cases where an indigent defendant is guilty of a crime and 
may take a lesser sentence by avoiding trial, this is probably in his or her best 
interest.  But when pro se defendants considering pro se representation 
 
 156. Effectively Ineffective, supra note 76, at 1731–32 (“Due to the political unpopularity of 
criminal defendants and their lack of financial and political capital, state legislatures are unlikely 
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staunchly profess their innocence, and are unwilling to take any sort of deal, 
the pressure put on them by their appointed attorney to plead only entrenches 
the notion that the system is against them and that their best option is to go it 
alone. 
“One of the reasons that so many people plead guilty is because they really 
don’t have legal representation,” which Bright attributes to large case volumes 
and insufficient resources.162 This is particularly true with regards to many 
private court-appointed attorneys, who have a contract with the court to handle 
all cases that come their way for a flat fee.163  In such scenarios, there is “a 
built-in conflict of interest” because of the attorney’s incentive to spend more 
time on cases earning them money in their private practice.164  Other 
defendants choose to plead to crimes they did not commit or to charges that are 
beyond the scope of their crime for fear that a conviction will lead to 
substantially longer jail time.165  As former Attorney General Janet Reno put it, 
“a good lawyer is the best defense against wrongful conviction.”166  In the 
minds of many indigent defendants, however, a “good lawyer” is hardly an 
option.167  Under that pretense, the decision to go pro se seems to stem more 
from fear and the need to resist the pressure to plead rather than one based on 
true reflection.  At a minimum, by going pro se, some indigent defendants will 
evade the pressure to plead. 
III.  MAKING THE DECISION TO PROCEED PRO SE 
There are a host of reasons why some criminal defendants choose self-
representation.  For many indigent defendants, however, the decision hinges on 
their distrust of the legal system, which cannot be helped by the increasing 
deterioration of the criminal defense system.  Moreover, being poor only 
intensifies the “feelings of alienation and powerlessness” when facing criminal 
prosecution.168  Other indigent defendants may choose pro se representation for 
strategic reasons, perhaps persuaded by the ability to cross-examine their 
accusers, hopes of establishing a “better rapport with jurors,” and the chance to 
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bargain for “greater latitude in allowed behavior and questioning than would 
be given a defense attorney.”169 
Yet it is my contention that a vast majority of indigent defendants, while 
perhaps influenced by some of these motives, choose to go pro se because they 
believe it is the only viable option to escape the pressure to plead, and the only 
way to present a formidable defense.  The story of Tyrone Jackson is indicative 
of the situation faced by many indigent defendants who are forced to choose 
between acquiescence to unsatisfactory indigent defense counsel and self-
representation. 
A. Inside the Mind of the Pro Se Defendant: Interview with Tyrone Jackson 
Federal prosecutors indicted Tyrone Jackson on January 8, 2008, for 
charges that, if convicted, could result in him spending the next 20 years to his 
natural life in a federal penitentiary.170  Mr. Jackson was assigned a federal 
public defender, who he considered to be a “nice guy” and who he conceded 
was probably an “excellent attorney.”171  Yet Mr. Jackson opted for pro se 
representation; largely because he felt his attorney failed to appreciate the 
gravity of his situation.172  Admitting to having been arrested on an average of 
four to five times a year, which he dismissed as commonplace for African–
American men where he comes from, this was by far the most serious charge 
he ever faced.173 
For Mr. Jackson, a lack of trust was at the heart of his decision to elect pro 
se representation.174  He ultimately waived his right to counsel and elected to 
represent himself, not because he felt he was more equipped to handle his case, 
but rather, because he felt he had no choice in order to fairly present his case to 
a jury.175  He did so in an attempt to circumvent the same old routine by which 
indigent criminal defendants like him were convicted.176  Mr. Jackson referred 
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to the criminal justice process as “a dance” in which everyone (the defense 
attorney, prosecutor, and judge) knows the routine, except the defendant.177 
So rather than allowing the prosecutor to present the “same case, with the 
same witnesses . . . that he presented last week” and allowing an appointed 
defense attorney to argue that another “black client with dreadlocks wasn’t a 
drug dealer,” Mr. Jackson decided he had a better shot of convincing a jury of 
his innocence if he conducted his own defense.178  In doing so, he hoped to 
dispel any stereotypes jurors may have had about him because of his 
appearance and implore them to consider his case as if they were in his shoes.  
Yet not all indigent defendants exhibit this level of perseverance when facing 
status quo, unsatisfactory representation and subsequent imprisonment.  Many 
lie down and accept their fate as decided by indigent defense counsel, who 
does not necessarily have their best interests in mind.179 
Mr. Jackson vehemently rejecting any sort of plea bargain.  What 
concerned him most was that his attorney never even asked him his side of the 
story prior to advising him to plead guilty for a lesser sentence: “He never even 
asked me if I was innocent or guilty.”180  According to Mr. Jackson, his 
attorney’s attitude was, “They say that you did A, B, and C . . . that they [are] 
gonna bring in Susie, Bobby, and Johnny, and that they’re all going to testify 
to this.”181  This indicated to Mr. Jackson that his attorney “saw it the way they 
[the prosecutors] see it.”182  Mr. Jackson recalled, “Well, when I started to tell 
him I was innocent, the melancholy face come on . . . like ‘everybody tells me 
this.’”183  So, according to Mr. Jackson, his attorney’s attitude was 
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“basically . . . just plead out.”184  Uncompromising in professing his innocence, 
Mr. Jackson decided he had to go pro se in order to “fight” for himself.185 
Unlike most indigent defendants who routinely attempt to fire their 
appointed attorneys prior to making the decision to go pro se,186 Mr. Jackson 
dismissed the possibility of asking the court for another attorney.187  He 
recognized that, in his situation, another appointed attorney would likely result 
in the same level of dissatisfaction.  When asked if he considered another 
attorney, Mr. Jackson responded, “I thought about another lawyer, but I’m in 
jail with 14–15 people in the cell that are complaining the same way about 
their attorney that I am.  Out of those people, maybe 3–4 different attorney 
names came up, so we all had basically had the same attorney.”188  Rather than 
look like a “pest,” Mr. Jackson opted for pro se representation.189 
B. Fundamental Distrust of Indigent Defense Counsel 
Rodney Holmes, standby counsel for Mr. Jackson during his trial and a 
highly respected criminal defense attorney, acknowledged that a vast majority 
of criminal defendants realize their ineptness in formulating a defense for their 
cases.190  Yet, he attributes the pro se willingness of some indigent defendants 
to their “fundamental distrust” of the government.191  Mr. Holmes believes this 
distrust derives from the greater presence that law enforcement officials 
maintain in lower class areas, namely due to the correlative higher crimes 
rates.192  He notes that those choosing to go pro se typically have greater 
abilities—such as the ability to read and analyze cases.  Does this make them 
more equipped than lawyers with extensive legal training?  Probably not.  But 
then why go pro se?193 
Another source of distrust for appointed defense counsel is the indigent 
defendants’ misunderstanding of the inner workings of the criminal justice 
system.  This culminates with the notion that everyone involved is working to 
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“get them.”  For all the shortcomings of indigent defense systems in the United 
States, either in the form of public defender offices or private attorneys 
retained by the courts, such lawyers are often competent and willing to 
passionately advocate for indigent defendants’ rights.  Further, courts have the 
advantage of knowing competent attorneys in the area best-suited to handle 
indigent defense cases.  Yet the “bad apple” spoils the bunch adage applies to 
evaluating indigent defense counsel as a whole.  Even still, such defendants 
may fail to grasp how a court-appointed attorney is not necessarily a public 
defender,194 and many even refuse to recognize a public defender as an actual 
attorney.195  The following displays the state of confusion that exists: 
Indigents commonly mistrust the public defender assigned to them and view 
him as part of the same court bureaucracy that is ‘processing’ and convicting 
them.  The lack of trust is a major obstacle to establishing an effective 
attorney-client relationship. The problem was captured in a sad exchange 
between a social science researcher and a prisoner: “Did you have a lawyer 
when you went to court.” “No.  I had a public defender.”196 
Another defendant at the federal courthouse in East St. Louis, Illinois, 
during the summer of 2008 also chose to represent himself.197  Kevin Cooper, 
who was facing federal drug trafficking charges, elected to go pro se after he 
saw his court-appointed attorney laughing with the prosecutor prior to a 
preliminary hearing for his trial.198  Mr. Cooper’s court-appointed counsel was 
a former prosecutor-turned-defense attorney, and Mr. Cooper allegedly did not 
trust him because of his prior work in the prosecutor’s office.199  This 
perceived closeness between the prosecution and defense illustrates another 
root of the distrust criminal defendants, particularly those familiar with the 
system, may develop over time.  It also shows the misunderstanding criminal 
defendants have of the lawyer’s ethical obligations to his or her clients. 
Mr. Cooper was likely influenced by his successful experience defending 
himself against an ill-conceived attempted murder charge in state court several 
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years prior to his federal drug case.200  Rather than resulting in a no-charge due 
to self-defense, or at best, a charge of assault, prosecutors charged Mr. Cooper 
with attempted murder.201  Mr. Cooper’s optimism following his original win 
in state court also derives from the notion that widely-publicized incidents of 
self-representation make pro se representation the popular thing to do.202  As 
more and more indigent defendants choose self-representation, it is reasonably 
foreseeable that an avalanche of pro se defendants will result from pro se fairy 
tales disseminated through city streets and prison halls.  To combat this, it 
would behoove trial courts to take their waiver of counsel duties more 
seriously in order to ward off the inevitable headaches from an onslaught of 
indigent pro se defendants flooding their courtrooms. 
IV.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
Throughout this Comment, I have proposed several solutions aimed at 
alleviating concerns of those wishing to see indigent criminal defendants 
acquiesce to counsel, and believe that courts should respect the free will of 
defendants opting self-representation.  In addition, I believe every jurisdiction 
should produce some sort of handbook for indigent defendants contemplating 
self-representation, for example: “The Indigent Criminal Defendant Guide to 
Choosing a Mode of Defense.”  Much like a “Patient’s Bill of Rights” between 
doctors and patients in the healthcare setting, this handbook would include a 
document to be signed by both client and attorney, detailing what each expects 
from the case.  For instance, there may be a clause that reads, “As client, I am 
entitled to provide my input into how my case should best be handled.”  Or 
even, from the lawyer’s standpoint, “I will do all in my power to fulfill the 
wishes of you, my client, in zealously advocating your case.” 
What will this proposed handbook accomplish?  It is a simple document 
which provides tangible peace of mind to those indigent defendants who feel 
scorned, mistreated, or left out by the criminal justice system and/or skeptical 
about the level of representation they will receive from indigent defense 
counsel.  For the lawyer, it will reiterate the codes of professional conduct 
expected of them when representing their clients.  For courts, it might 
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minimize the number of indigent defendants choosing self-representation by 
furthering the appearance of justice being served in our system. 
Another proposal stems from the idea that indigent defendants should have 
the right to retain counsel with attorneys when they have established trust from 
prior cases.203  Building on this notion, indigent defendants should be 
presented with a biographical array of five indigent defense attorneys at the 
outset of their case.  After allowing the defendant to analyze each prospective 
attorney’s qualifications, experience, and prior case handlings, he or she may 
list an order of preferences for the five attorneys.  Based on availability of 
those five, the court may make a good-faith effort to fulfill the defendant’s first 
choice, second choice, and so forth.  At a minimum, this will instill trust in the 
indigent defendant’s mind that he has at least some say in who represents him.  
This may diminish the feelings of resentment toward indigent defense counsel 
that result when a court says, “This is your attorney, take it or leave it.” 
Similar such proposals have faced staunch resistance, with those in 
opposition citing the fear that defendants familiar with the system will 
monopolize the most competent attorneys.  Perhaps this possibility should not 
be dismissed as a problem, but should serve as a case study for how those 
attorneys interact with their indigent clients in order to gain their trust.  The 
time has come for innovation in the way we dole out indigent defense counsel.  
When I proposed this idea and stated the common oppositions to Mr. Jackson, 
he noted, “there’s something right about” those attorneys who indigent 
defendants prefer, and “maybe [we] need to figure out what’s right with 
them.”204  Taking it a step further, perhaps an incentive system should reward 
attorneys who foster faith from their indigent clients in order to encourage 
others to act with the same benevolence.  This sort of program, if implemented 
properly, may pave the way for the sort of meaningful relationship in line with 
the rallying call by Justice Scalia in Gonzalez–Lopez.205  Over time, such a 
bold and, admittedly, difficult-to-implement initiative may begin to dissuade 
would-be indigent pro se defendants from rejecting the assistance of counsel. 
During my interview with Mr. Jackson, I spent over two hours talking with 
him about his plight.  Most indigent defense attorneys, strapped by time 
constraints, do not have that luxury.  Mr. Jackson did not know me before our 
meeting, but I could tell that after talking for a while, he became more and 
more comfortable.  Whether he trusted me, however, I cannot be sure.  But I 
could tell that he appreciated the opportunity to sit down with someone and tell 
his story.  Perhaps providing more law students the opportunity to assist in 
indigent representation would diminish feelings of despair felt by indigent 
defendants like Mr. Jackson.  Allowing law students to assist on a larger scale 
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may convey that at least someone is willing to sit down with them and discuss 
their case.  That does not seem like too much to ask. 
CONCLUSION 
For anything to change the way indigent criminal defendants are treated by 
our justice system or to alleviate their perceptions of unfairness, however 
misguided, there must be a whirlwind recognition of the importance of the 
right to counsel for indigent defendants in criminal proceedings.  Policy 
makers and legislatures, motivated by the whims of their constituencies, likely 
will not bring about change in the way indigent criminal defendants are treated, 
either in perception or reality.  Because of this, the courts must take the 
initiative, acting as a parent advising their child with regard to certain courses 
of action, and providing them with all the necessary information to make an 
intelligent decision as best they can.  Few in the legal profession can relate to 
the plight faced by indigent criminal defendants.  Yet I hope that most can now 
understand the reaction by those defendants who feel scorned by the system, 
turn their back to the assistance of appointed counsel, and choose self-
representation. 
MARK C. MILTON 
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